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COMMENTARY 

TOWARD A PHENOMENOLOGY OF 

CONTRACT· ADJUDICATION 

Stewart T. Graham, Jr. * 
Contract adjudication typically has been presented as a series 
of objective facts which, taken as a whole, compel certain jural con­
sequences. I That is, adjudication has been understood as the 
aligning of conceptual abstractions, such as rules and principles, 
with the facts of the case to reveal the conclusion of law. This char­
acterization is applicable whether one invokes an analytical or nor­
mative theory of law. Both types of theories generally treat law and 
adjudication as structures existing apart from the individuals in­
volved. Legal adjudication is seen as an existing structure through 
which facts are sorted on their way to becoming the context for a 
legal decision. This objectification of adjudication fails to account 
for the subjective field of human action which gives meaning to 
these "facts." Without a human subject there are no facts; without 
a human subject there is no meaning. An act cannot be cut out of 
history labeled, for example, an element of a contract, and pres­
ented as a specimen for study. Acts have meaning only within an 
intersubjective context which gives them meaning. A promise has 
meaning, or is a promise, only within a relationship of individuals 
who share an understanding of the world in general and of a cer­
tain experience in particular. 
Legal adjudication must be understood as a particular arena 'of 
intersubjectivity in which individuals perform a certain activity 
which has meaning only because of that background of intersub­
jectivity. It is this background which provides structures for un­
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. 
B.A. 1967, J.D. 1970, University of Florida; L.L.M. 1973, S.J.D. 1974, University of 
Virginia. 
1. This is true even of natural law theorists, who although they conceive law as 
deriving from some transcendental norm still objectify the process by which that 
norm is applied in resolving disputes. Professor Peter Gable's article, addressing the 
subjectivity of law, deals with the phenomenon of contractual condition as a vehicle 
for the explication of law "from the interior." Gable, Intention and Structure in Con­
tractual Conditions, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977). 
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derstanding the world and the acts of others. It is a background of 
commonality and familiarity which makes experience conventional. 
If law and adjudication can be understood as lived responses to 
conflicts occurring within a familiar structure of social life, then our 
ability to teach and to understand law and adjudication, and to 
restructure the legal process in ways more attuned to the human 
situation underlying our cultural institutions will be improved. 
This article presents legal adjudication as an activity of human 
beings. The essential nature of adjudication is subjective and it is 
inaccessible when the activity is objectified. Accordingly, this arti­
cle presents an understanding of legal adjudication as a subjective 
process, using contract adjudication as the context for the presenta­
tion. 2 Furthermore, as this discussion develops, the superiority of 
this subjective analysis over the traditional approach will become 
clear. 
The discussion proceeds in three sections. The first two pres­
ent a descriptive analysis of the adjudication of contractual disputes, 
dealing first with consideration and then with unconscionability. 
The final section offers an analysis of adjudication through the phe­
nomenon of minimal equality, which is described in the earlier sec­
tions as the basis for the results reached in the adjudication dis­
cussed therein. These two aspects of contract law have been 
2. The methodology used is that of phenomenology and language philosophy. 
The language philosophy most involved here is that of Ludwig Wittgenstein. See L. 
WI1TGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (3d ed. G. Anscomb trans. 1958). 
An attempt has been made to demystify phenomenology by translating its rather spe­
cial vocabulary into ordinary language. This may result in some distortions of the 
phenomenological account, but not to any great measure. Though generally thought 
to be disparate, these philosophies are complementary in purpose. See 49 THE 
MONIST (1964), which was devoted to a discussion of this relatedness, or rather 
whether this relatedness in fact existed. See, e.g., E. Gendlin, What are the Grounds of 
Explication? id. at 137; P. Kuntz, Order in Language, Phenomena and Reality, id. at 
107. See also J. Wild, Is There a World of Ordinary Language? 67 PHILOSOPHICAL 
REV. 460 (1958). None of these writers, nor this writer asserts a total harmony ex­
isting below the surface of these philosophical methods. Just that their purpose is to 
make the world in which we live more accessible to understanding through the de­
scription of that world, i.e., the subjective world of everyday experience. They deal 
with the world as it is lived, prior to any objectification for scientific analysis. This is 
not to assert an anti-science attitude; it is to profess a commitment to the phenomena 
themselves as they reveal themselves and as they are experienced, rather than to a 
theoretical explanation of how or what they must be. Phenomenology speaks of this 
"world" as a life world. By this is meant an horizon within which the phenomena of 
our daily world are understood in a lived articulation of meaning. As John Wild has 
stated it: "[Tlhe world horizon of human life is concrete, subjective, and relative to 
man." Id. 
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selected for discussion because of their familiarity and the interest 
and controversy they generate. Finally, the article is intended to 
be descriptive, not normative. Thus, questions such as whether 
consideration or unconscionability are desirable concepts have not 
been addressed. 
CONSIDERATION 
This section offers an analysis of consideration which reflects, 
primarily, the understandings of language developed in ordinary 
language philosophy. The importance of the perspective taken and 
the relational analysis presented will become apparent as the 
discussion proceeds. 3 Analysis of the concept of consideration be­
gins with the role the term plays within legal discourse and, more 
particularly, with regard to the speech situation in which it is used. 
This would appear to be true of all linguistic phenomena. 4 Lan­
guage is not a calculus with each term being a label for an object. 
Clearly, some terms do perform a labeling function, but few, if 
any, serve that function alone. For example, the term tree can be 
used to label a particular physical object just outside a window, or 
it can be used more broadly without reference to any particular ob­
ject. Also, it can be used metaphorically-"He stood like a tree 
. . . ." Further, using the term tree signals a botanical field in 
which differentiations and relationships have been established and 
which is contrasted with other fields of perceptual experience. 
In the field of human action, however, the labeling function of 
terms is nearly nonexistent. It is here that language is all important 
because action takes place only in and through language. It is only 
we who talk that can give voice to intentions, motives, causes, 
fears and beliefs.5 In analyzing human action, the central concern 
is with the purpose of the act, not the physical, causal factors. The 
discourse about and of human action is performative. 6 For exam­
3. For a good bibliography in the area of ordinary language philosophy see H. 
PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 341, 341-50 (1972). 
4. This is not to suggest that linguistic phenomena cannot be understood as as­
pects of certain cultural structures, such as capitalism. See Gable, supra note 1. How­
ever, concepts are acts of consciousness which are linguistic, as opposed to non­
verbal acts, such as perception. Therefore, it is necessary to become oriented with 
the linguistic field in which these phenomena are used. 
5. H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 158 (1958). See also H. PITKIN, supra 
note 3 (good discussion of the function of language). 
6. J. L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233-53 (2d ed. 1970). Performative is 
used not in the strict sense of J. L. Austin's definition which is that to speak or to 
456 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:453 
pIe, the term "fact" is not a label for anything, nor do we create a 
"fact" by using the term, but we do perform an action by and 
through its use. To use "fact," one posits a perspective which one 
assumes toward the phenomenon to which reference is made. One 
also presupposes agreement regarding the phenomenon in the cul­
ture or subculture which provides the background for the 
discussion, and establishes criteria for judging disagreement, for 
example, there is a difference between opinion and fact. To use the 
term "fact" tells more about the speaker than it does about the 
phenomenon being discussed. This is true of most terms used in 
discourse of and about human action. Again, it is the point of the 
action, not causal factors that is important. The point of an action is 
always displayed against a background into which the action fits 
and from which it derives meaning. To understand the meaning of 
a term, one must analyze the speech situation of which it is a 
part. 7 Any discussion of human action must be understood in terms 
of the human situation which is constitutive of that action. 
A court's use of the term "consideration" serves as a starting 
point for analysis. One must not assume that that use is always the 
same or always different. Furthermore, not only must the subjec­
tive intention of the speaker be considered but also the objective 
ambiance of the act is relevant. Actions are social phenomena, and 
thus an understanding of actions requires all relevant perspectives 
to be considered. The subjective intention of the action cannot be 
ignored, but neither can it be given total dominance. It is neces­
sary to step back from the action, to "loosen the intentional 
threads"8 that tie us to the phenomenon, in order to see it in its 
fullness. In this way, one can accredit the subjective intention 
while placing the act within a broader social context to gain a more 
complete understanding. 
Use of the term "consideration" in an opinion signals the 
court's perspective of the relationship existing between the parties 
use the term is to perform the act, for example "to promise." To say "I promise" is to 
perform the act of promising. Pitkin, following Wittgenstein, noted that all language 
is performative, but in a looser sense than Austin's definition. Pitkin's definition is 
quasi-performative. H. PITKIN, supra note 3, at 39. 
7. See generally L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, §§ 21-23, at 10-11 & § 43, at 
20.:21. 
8. I have borrowed this phrase from Maurice Merleau-Ponty. M. MERLEAU­
PONTY, Preface to PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION at XIII (C. Smith trans. 1970). 
Intentionality is the opening out of consciousness onto the world; it holds us in the 
world or ties us to it. The point here is to loosen those ties or that hold in order to 
understand the phenomena which are being held in relation. 
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of the lawsuit. It signals the existence of a legal system structured 
to give force to that reiationship. The focus of this discussion is pri­
marily on the quasi-performative function of the court's usage. The 
court's use of the term "consideration" creates a jural relationship 
with its attendant consequences, or terminates a conflict relation­
ship in which the social and jural relational lines were skewed. 
Terminating a conflict relationship is as much a positive act as 
creating a jural relationship because it brings the parties into a dif­
ferent relationship of classified responsibilities and consequences. 
It is in this sense that courts use the term "consideration" affirma­
tively both to. enforce and to deny enforcement to a purported 
contract. 
By stressing that consideration is a necessary "element" in a 
contract, one may hinder a clear appreciation of the actual use of 
the term by the courts. "Element," suggests some objective refer­
ent, some piece to be fitted into the puzzle to complete the pic­
ture. "Consideration" is a linguistic device which a court uses in an 
appropriate speech situation to move the parties into a relationship 
which expresses the court's understanding of the circumstances. 
This may be a movement into or out of a contractual relationship. 
It is not "part" of a "contract," but an expression of whether a con­
tractual relation will be recognized. 
Characterizing consideration as an "element" in a contract is 
misleading both to consideration and to contracts. These terms are 
used as concepts and have reality only within a linguistic system. 
Thus, the word "contract" has sense because of its use, not because 
it "exists." The term is used quasi-performatively to move parties 
into a particular jural relationship with attendant consequences 
imposed by the legal system. Authoritative use of the term "con­
tract" discloses the perspective the speaker has of the relationship 
of the parties with reference to whom the term was used. Such us­
age creates an authoritative relationship for the parties, thus mov­
ing them into a new position, but it does so along relational lines 
already existing and against the background of the legal system. 
The use of the term directs one's attention to considerations of 
both the parties' relation to each other and their relation to the le­
gal system. 
The various perspectives from which consideration is viewed 
are manifested in cases. What counts as consideration in particular 
cases becomes the question. In what sense can the term "consider­
ation" be used with reference to disparate factual situations? Com­
pare for example, football, chess, solitaire, hop scotch and extem­
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poraneous children's games. .What common properties do they 
share, if any, which allows us to call them all games? What is the 
difference between playing and playing a game? What are the con­
sequences of calling an action a game, or calling it something else? 
What are we doing when we use the term "game"? 
These kinds of questions also can be raised about considera­
tion. Consideration has been variously seen as an exchange of 
promises, promise in return for performance, benefit to the prom­
isor, detriment to the promisee and moral obligation. What com­
mon properties do all these situations share, if any, which allows 
the term "consideration" to be applied to them? What are the con­
sequences of the use or non-use of consideration with reference to 
any of those cases? What is being done when the term "considera­
tion" is used? 
It is necessary to look at the use of consideration in legal dis­
course, restricted here to the common law, in order to disclose the 
relatedness of the uses. This cluster of uses delineates the grammar 
of the term which contains the germ of its meaning. Isolation of 
the grammar of "consideration" allows one to adopt an intellectual 
distance for the phenomenon and thus to identify a sense of mean­
ing which transcends any particular instance of use. 
The classic case of Hamer v. Sidway 9 provides a starting point 
for analysis. It involved a promise by an uncle to pay his nephew 
$5,000 on the latter's twenty-first birthday if the nephew would re­
frain from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or 
billiards for money until that time. The nephew complied with the 
terms as he had promised, and his assignee sought enforce­
ment. The nephew had actively relied on the promise, conforming 
his actions to the terms of the agreement in order to reap the ben­
efit of the promise. This active reliance induced by the promise 
was termed consideration by the court, and the promise was en­
forced. 10 
The central question was whether the promise was a gift with 
a condition or an offer for a contract. ll No conclusive argument can 
be made for one instead of the other characterization. The crucial 
point is enforceability. In the circumstances of the case, only the 
contractual reading would yield enforceability since no delivery had 
taken place to make the gift irrevocable. The answer revolves 
about the question of why the court wanted to enforce. Professor 
9. 124 N.Y. 538, 27 N.E. 256 (1891). 
10. ld. at 548, 27 N.E. at 257. 
11. ld. at 545, 27 N.E. at 257. 
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Lon Fuller asks what the result would have been if it were an ex­
ecutory bilateral contract and the uncle sued upon the nephew's 
breach. 12 Odds are that the court would have seen the uncle's 
promise as one for a gift with a condition, in no way obligating the 
nephew to take or to forbear from taking any action. To find obliga­
tion here, without more involvement by the nephew, would be an 
intolerable limitation on his freedom and would put him at the un­
cle's mastery. This kind of relationship is too out of balance to be 
enforced. Thus, even though a promise generally may be consider­
ation, in this case it probably would not be. One can say that the 
uncle was not asking for a promise, but for action. Therefore, the 
nephew's promise was not the consideration requested. But if 
the uncle were suing, then it would appear that he had accepted 
the promise as sufficient to obligate the nephew, and himself, upon 
its fulfillment. He saw it as being in exchange for and related to his 
own promise. At that point of their relationship, however, the 
probability is that no contract would be found. 
The crucial factor is the relationship. The different legal con­
clusions can be reconciled by studying the changes in the relation­
ship of the parties from the hypothetical case to the actual case. 
First, the active reliance by the nephew on the promise distorted 
the relational lines structuring the uncle-nephew relationship ab­
sent any counterbalancing obligation running from the uncle to the 
nephew. This. relational imbalance is critical, as will be developed 
more fully later. Secondly, an innocent third party, the assignee, 
had also acted in reliance on the promise, thereby further skewing 
the relationship. The nephew still would be liable on the underly­
ing debt if no recovery was forthcoming from the uncle's estate. 
This indicates additional reliance by the nephew and adds to the 
relational imbalance and compels the court towards enforceability. 
The degree to which imbalance must be manifested is the initial 
question but it will be deferred until a few more cases are 
reviewed. 
Sylvan Crest Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 13 demon­
strates quite clearly the point that the underlying relational balance 
between the parties determines whether consideration exists and 
whether the relationship should be called "contractual." The case 
involved a federal procurement contract by which the plaintiff was 
to deliver trap rock to an airport project as required by the defend­
ant and the latter was to give appropriate delivery instructions. 
12. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 797,817 (1941). 
13. 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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Upon the defendant's failure to request delivery of trap rock within 
a reasonable time after the contract was operative, plaintiff sued for 
breach. Defendant moved for and was granted summary judgment, 
arguing that a contractual provision allowing the defendant to can­
cel the contract at any time rendered the contract illusory, that is, 
the contract was without consideration from the defendant for the 
plaintiff's promised performance. 14 
The court looked to the intended relationship between the 
parties, the one which was actually prevailing prior to the dispute: 
"No one can read the document as a whole without concluding that 
the parties intended a contract to re.sult. "15 Then the court consid­
ered the relational balance which would attend the perspectives of 
each party. The' defendant's position would require the plaintiff to 
be bound to deliver but it did not bind the defendant to accept or 
to pay. IS If no action had been taken by plaintiff, this may be a 
reasonable argument, after all, the clause is rather absolute on its 
face,17 and perhaps parties should be held to their contractual lan­
guage. The plaintiff, however, had acted,18 and was holding itself 
ready to continue performance. Thus, the language of the defend­
ant's form contract was intended to and did induce reliance by' the 
plaintiff, and did effect a change in their relationship. The parties 
had entered into and were acting within a particular relationship. 
By so inducing reliance, in terms of plaintiff's preparing for per­
formance and its continued readiness to perform, the defendant 
created a relationship in which, if any balance was to be manifest, 
it must counterbalance plaintiff's obligations and actions. The court 
found this counterbalance in an implied promise by the defendant 
either to give delivery instructions or notice of cancellation within 
a reasonable time after the contract was completed. 19 This was 
characterized as the consideration given by defendant for plaintiff's 
promise to deliver the rock. 20 
Consideration here was implied or read in by the court be­
cause of the existing relationship of the parties. 21 The relational 
14. Id. at 643. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 644. 
17. "Cancellation by the Procurement Division may be affected at any time." 
Id. at 643. 
18. At least four deliveries were made, and payment received. Id. at 644 n.!. 
19. ld. at 644. 
20. ld. 
21. ld. at 645. 
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imbalance which would have resulted from defendant's non­
obligatory status within the relationship compelled the court to 
enforce the contract. Reliance intentionally induced by defendant's 
actions resulted in plaintiff's being placed in a grossly subservient 
position vis-a-vis the defendant. The court monitored the relation­
ship by using "good faith" as the relational standard against which 
to judge the parties' action. 22 Good faith would preclude the de­
fendant from taking advantage of such an unbalanced relation­
ship.23 This reading of the circumstances clearly denotes the 
proper judicial resolution. Worthy of examination is why the court 
allowed the relationship to continue even though the plaintiff 
incurred the greater risk. 
Two final cases dealing with consideration present, perhaps, 
the most difficult analytical problem., These cases, Webb v. Mc­
Gowin24 and Harrington v. Taylor,25 \involve. questions of moral 
consideration. Whether moral obligations should or should not be 
sufficient basis for consideration is a question outside the scope of 
this article. Also, bracketed out from discussion is whether consid­
eration is effective and efficient in operation. For present purposes, 
moral obligation presents questions which are analytically impor­
tant because it displays the internal vectors which aid in shaping 
the doctrine of consideration. 
In Webb, 26 the plaintiff had saved McGowin's life by holding 
onto and diverting from McGowin a heavy pine block which plain­
tiff had dropped from an upper level of a mill to the ground floor. 
Plaintiff had acted properly in dropping the block in the course of 
his duties. As a result of his actions, plaintiff was permanently crip­
pled and could no longer work. McGowin promised to pay him fif­
teen dollars every two weeks from the time of the injury through­
out plaintiff's life. These payments were made until McGowin 
died. His estate then refused to continue the payments and plain­
tiff sued. The court held that McGowin had a moral obligation 
arising out of his receipt of a material benefit and this obligation 
was sufficient consideration to support a promise to pay.27 
Harrington 28 involved a somewhat similar situation. The de­
22. ld. at 643, 644. 
23. ld. 
24. 232 Ala. 374, 168 So. 199 (1936). 
25. 225 N.C. 690, 36 S.E.2d 227 (1945). 
26. See note 24 supra. 
27. 232 Ala. at 375, 168 So. at 199. 
28. ld. 
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fendant had assaulted his wife and she took refuge in plaintiff's 
house. On the next day defendant gained entrance to the house 
and continued his assault. "[D]efendant's wife knocked him down 
with an axe and was on the point of cutting his head open or 
decapitating him ... ,"29 when plaintiff intervened. Apparently, 
she deflected the axe with her hand, saving defendant's life but 
injuring her hand quite seriously. Subsequently, defendant prom­
ised to pay plaintiff for her damages. He paid a small amount but 
then discontinued payment and plaintiff sued. The court held that 
plaintiff's actions were insufficient to provide consideration for de­
fendant's promise. 3o 
Again, the question of reconciling the different results on simi­
lar factual patterns deserves attention. Both cases involve injury to 
a person in(!urred while that person was saving the life of another, 
who subsequently promises to make payment, does pay and then 
payment is terminated. Clearly, legal decisions are not the mere 
application of legal rules to sets of facts. As was argued implicitly in 
Webb,31 the nature of the relationship of the litigants orients the 
court toward the conclusion and determines the principles of law 
which the court will choose to apply. The Restatement of Con­
tracts32 and Harrington 33 seem to imply that the critical factor in 
cases of moral obligation is the relationship of the parties, including 
the nature of the benefit received for which a promise to pay, or 
render other benefit was given. The concern is whether the rela­
tionship was such that a reciprocal benefit to the promisee was ex­
pected or needed so as to inject a sense of fairness or relational 
balance into the case. If the thesis advanced is an accurate descrip­
tion of the legal process, then in these two cases, the courts must 
have perceived either a relational imbalance which would be ad­
justed through enforcement of the promise, or that enforcement 
would create an imbalance. The Restatement reflects this percep­
tion when it states: 
Although in general a person who has been unjustly enriched at 
the expense of another is required to make restitution, restitu­
tion is denied in many cases in order to protect persons who 
29. 225 N.C. at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227. 
30. Id. 
31. 232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199. 
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89A (Tent. Draft nos. 1-7, 1973). 
Generally, contract law denies the legal efficacy of "moral consideration." 225 N.C. 
at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227. 
33. 225 N.C. at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227. 
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have had benefits thrust upon them ... or to guard against false 
claims ....34 
A subsequent promise in ... a case [of emergency service] may 
remove doubt as to the reality of the benefit and as to its value, 
and may negate any danger of imposition or false claim. 35 
In our two cases, however, there is no doubt as to the reality or 
value of the benefit conferred. There is no doubt that the promises 
were made; payments in fact were made in each case. What then 
accounts for the differing results? The answer requires defining the 
ground of legal decisionmaking. 
Legal decisions are human actions which are judgments upon 
other human action. Thus, the basis of a decision lies within the 
intersubjectivity which structures the life world and makes the ac­
tions of the parties and the judges understandable. This under­
standing is based upon the subjective interpretation of the action 
by the actor. 36 Individuals, at the first awareness, are in a shared 
world and on the way toward realizing certain possibilities. Persons 
have a natural attunement to the world which allows them to form 
constructs which order their fields of action. 37 These constructs are 
the ground for reflective interpretation of action. Thus, interpreta­
tion of human action proceeds upon a preinterpreted field of ac­
tion, preinterpreted by both the actor and the analyst. Thus, any 
action has to be understood as the actor understood it. A situation 
has to be perceived in terms of the constructs of the actor: his mo­
tivations, goals and fears. The actor has preinterpreted the action 
of the other by typifying the motives, goals and attitudes of others. 
The act of others in "this" situation is but an instance of that typifi­
cation. 38 What is taken as typical is determined by the situation, 
the problem-at-hand as Alfred Schutz terms it. 39 
Thus, to make a judgment upon anyone's action in a particular 
case, for example, formation of a contract, fraud or murder, re­
quires the judge to understand the actor's subjective interpre­
tation of his situtation. The actor imbues the action with meaning; 
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89A, Comment b, at 198 (Tent. 
Draft nos. 1-7, 1973). 
35. Id. Comment d, at 199. 
36. Schutz, Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences, in EXISTEN­
TIAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND POLITICAL THEORY 96 (H.Y. Jung ed. 1972). 
37. Id. at 98. 
38. Id. at 100. 
39. Id. at 99. 
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to determine intent, to determine responsibility or to determine 
state of mind requires the judge to determine, first, the actor's 
meaning. 
(In Webb,40 for example, the problem-at-hand, the litigation, 
defined for the construct that which was typical and that which was 
unique. Webb and McGowin imbued their actions and relationship 
with a certain meaning which became critical for resolution of the 
case. In determining this meaning, the judge can construct models 
of typical action upon the alternative construction advanced by the 
parties. He then can vary the situation to test action in the case 
against his model. The action of continuing payment throughout 
McGowin's life is consistent, given the facts of the case, only with 
typified action in a situation of recognition of benefit received and 
obligation incurred. Had McGowin not continued payment, that 
action could be' seen as being inconsistent with the construct. It is 
in their actions that their understanding of the situation and their 
actions lie. 41 
This is not to say that the actor's meaning is determinative of 
the legal issue, but it is of critical importance. The perspective of 
each party and of other witnesses must be considered. 42 A legal 
decision is a founded construct. It is a construct formed upon a 
prior construct. One can form such a construct and one can under­
stand the interpretation of the actor because the knowledge of the 
world upon which these constructs are found is rooted in a primor­
dial commonality of existence and knowledge. 
We are born into and share a common world; sociality charac­
terizes the fundamental content which gives shape and meaning to 
our lives and the understanding of our lives. Knowledge is social, 
and it is grounded in this shared epistemological and experiential 
background. 43 It is agai~st this background, generally nonthematic, 
40. 232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199. 
41. This same kind of construct formation is evident, perhaps most clearly, in 
"reasonable person" standards. 
42. For example, one of the major problems of evidence is the reconciliation of 
the subjective interpretations of the situations by each party, and by nonparty wit­
nesses. 
43. Schutz, supra note 36, at 101. Schutz says that knowledge is socialized in at 
least three respects: (1) It is structurally socialized through an idealization of a reci­
procity of perspectives which assumes that each of us would experience a situation 
the same as another i( we were to change places; (2) it is genetically socialized in 
that much of our knowledge is socially desired, as in socially approved terms; and (3) 
there is a social distribution of knowledge. ld. No one knows all of the world, and 
knowledge of anyone part varies in degree with individuals. 
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that decisions are made and other action is taken. This common 
sense orientation to the world, to others and our relationships to 
them, makes community possible. Legal decisions, as other forms 
of action, receive direction and sense from this backlog of common 
sense understanding of the world. A judge comes to his decision 
with a common sense, nonthematic acceptance of the nature of the 
world, and the relationships of men within his society. Factual pat­
terns emerging from or isolated against this background in the form 
of a legal dispute, carry with them an atmosphere of familiarity and 
sociality which orients the judge, which predisposes him toward a 
particular reading of those facts. Again, those facts which will be 
seen as typical and those as unique depend upon the problem at 
hand. In other words, if a judge is deciding a case in terms of lack 
of consideration, his perspective of the case will be different than if 
he must decide if certain conditions are precedent I'or promissory. ' 
Because cases' come to court against a background of familiarity and 
with a certain preattunement to the social word, the judge can deal 
with them within a framework of typification of the common sense 
constructs he forms of the world. This explains better than any rea­
son why like cases are and should be treated alike. It is this pri­
mordial familiarity or sociality which accounts for different results 
in factually different cases; it is the reason why a court chooses, in 
an existential sense, to view cases and facts differently. Because the 
structures of our existence are not rigid, we can and do see and 
experience events differently, but generally within a range of ac­
ceptable variation. Outside this range, perception is eccentric or 
aberrant. 
In cases of moral obligation such' as Webb 44 and HaTTington, 45 
the typification46 of the relationship of the parties, in terms of the 
courts' common sense understanding of these' kinds of relationships, 
clothes that relationship with a particular status which directs the 
court toward its conclusion. In Webb,47 the plaintiff Webb was car­
rying out his work duties when he found himself in the position of 
possibly harming McGowin. His relation to McGowin was up to 
that point non personal. He was permanently crippled as a result of 
saving McGowin's life. McGowin planned to pay a specific amount 
44. 232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199. 

45, 225 N.C. at 690,36 S.E.2d at 227. 

46. Schutz, supra note 36, at 101. 
47. 232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199. See also text accompanying notes 26 & 27 
supra. 
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for a specific period of time. Payments were made without any re­
pudiation beginning approximately one month after the accident. 
This action by McGowin induced a justifiable expectation, and pos­
sible reliance by Webb, and it appears that McGowin intended this 
result. 
McGowin intentionally created a new relationship between 
himself and Webb based upon his recognition of a moral debt that 
he owed to Webb. The action was taken with some deliberation, 
thereby reducing the threat of an emotional, spontaneous expres­
sion of gratitude lacking sober thought as to McGowin's ability to 
make the payments and his intent to do so. He purposely initiated 
a relationship in which expectation of and reliance on the payments 
was induced. This relationship had existed for several years, and a 
relational balance existed. To deny enforcement of the promise 
would destroy this balance. An interesting question is whether the 
court would have enforced the promise had only one payment 
been made and then McGowin repudiated. What seems crucial 
here, however, is how the parties looked at their relationship. 
Again, the subjective understanding of the actor is vital for an ob­
server's analysis of the act. It is to this subjectivity that the court 
looks to resolve the dispute, and it is by this subjectivity and by 
the court's subjectivity that an understanding of legal decisions is 
generated. 
In Harrington, 48 by contrast, the relationship is significantly 
different. The plaintiff involved herself in an apparently violent sit­
uation prior to the actual injurious actions. She had a direct and 
personal relation to the defendant. The defendant's promise to pay 
was emotionally spontaneous and nonspecific. He promised to pay 
for her "damages." Whether he meant medical bills only, or loss of 
use of her hand in addition, is undetermined. He apparently repu­
diated any continuing obligation after a small payment. The degree 
or permanence of injury to plaintiff is not stated. 
It is questionable whether the defendant intentionally created 
a new relationship between the parties which induced justifiable 
expectation and reliance by plaintiff. The defendant did not per­
ceive the relationship as obligatory nor long-lasting. There is no ev­
idence of sober reflection by the defendant in terms of his position, 
both financially and personally, in regard to such an undertaking. 
Consequently, no continuing relationship of reliance and expecta­
48. 225 N.C. at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227. See also text accompanying notes 28 & 29 
supra. 
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tion was established between the parties. Thrusting a jural relation­
ship on these parties under these facts may well have created a re­
lational imbalance. Whether one agrees that such an imbalance 
would have resulted is not relevant at this point. It is relevant that 
it seems the court may have so perceived that result. Had the de­
fendant made payments for a longer period of time, for example, 
for two years, then a different relationship may well have been cre­
ated and a relational balance established which the court would 
have to consider in resolving the case. 
Each of the factors discussed are drawn from the facts, but 
conveys an atmosphere which combines to construct a status, a 
typification of the event which is understandable and not unfamil­
iar. The motives and intentions of the parties thereby become ob­
jectively available for consideration by the court in its resolution. 
Through typification, the event takes its place in our world. It re­
tains its uniqueness but is not alien. The fact that it came about is 
not unique, but the way it came about is unique. Understanding 
the event is subjective, as one must grasp the way the actor under­
stood both thematically and nonthematically, this act, but it is also 
objective in terms of the typification of the event for judicial reso­
lution. The effect of typification is to allow the event to be ab­
stracted. It is classified, and thus makes possible the application of 
general principles. In this way, cases which are classified as similar 
through typification can be treated in accordance with the same 
principles. Like cases are treated alike. It is in the intersubjectivity 
of our shared world, however, that the existential choice is made as 
to the ultimate resolution of the difficult case. As indicated above, 
many, if not most, cases do not receive extended judicial consider­
ation. Such cases fall into clearly recognizable classifications based 
upon previous judicial and legislative action of the kind discussed. 
It follows that legal theory begins at the level of judicial typifica­
tion. Here subjectivity and objectivity come together to form the 
structure of the social institution called law. 
It is unnecessary for present purposes to analyze each area of 
consideration. The ones discussed have served to sketch the line of 
analysis to be followed. Considerations of relational halance derived 
from the typification of the individual event determine the judicial 
decision. In each of the cases discussed, it appears that courts 
move to create or to maintain a relational balance between the par­
ties. This may be achieved either through enforcement or non­
enforcement of a contract and consideration either is or is not pres­
ent in formal terms. To state it differently, the term consideration 
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was used affirmatively to move the parties into or out of a jural re­
lationship in order to achieve a relational balance between them 
within the limits of the existing social relations. This view of courts' 
use of consideration eliminates the apparent problem, in theory, of 
enforcing contracts without consideration such as those that con­
cern moral consideration or past consideration. When consideration 
is understood as signaling a system of dispute resolution in which 
relational balance is the essential factor in the decision regarding 
enforceability, and consideration is seen as a mode of expression 
regarding that balance, then no need exists to attempt to impose a 
symmetry through fictions or exceptions to the general rule. Yet, 
what is the ground of that determination? What determines when a 
relationship is so skewed, so imbalanced as to require nonen­
forcement, or when the balance is sufficient for enforcement? Con­
siderations of minimal equality form that ground. Before 
explicating that ground, however, it is necessary to analyze 
unconscionability to see if that term also leads to minimal equality 
as the ground of contracts. If so, then it will be appropriate to dis­
cuss contract adjudication in terms of minimal equality. 
UNCONSCIONABILITY 
Much has been written about unconscionability as it relates to 
contract law, especially since the Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) set forth unconscionability as a ground for partial or total 
nonenforcement. 49 Following the method of analysis used in the 
previous section, the ground of. unconscionability can be revealed 
through description of the te~m's linguistic and existential nature in 
a way which is both constructive and instructive. 
Initially, two positions may be noted which establish the stage 
for dialogue about unconscionability. 50 The first is that of Professor 
Arthur Allen Leff;51 the second, that of Professor M.P. Elling­
haus. 52 Leff objects to the code provision because he feels that 
"unconscionability" has no "reality referent. "53 Therefore, the term 
is meaningless and merely allows judges to use their own notions 
49. U.C.C. § 2-302. 
50. Hereinafter, legal unconscionability will be used only with reference to 
§ 2-302. 
51. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, U5 U. 
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
52. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757 (1969). 
53. See note 51 supra at 558. Though only explicitly stated in the conclusion, 
this appears to be the basis of his dissatisfaction. 
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of fairness to overturn or to modify a contract. One can only take 
Leff's criticism to be based upon a label theory of language, as 
earlier discussed. 54 Thus, because there is no thing, no objective 
reality, to which unconscionability refers, it has no meaning. True, 
unconscionability is unlike words, such as tree or rock, which label 
tangible objects. The region of discourse in which the terms are 
used are different. 
Unconscionability is used in discourse of and about human ac­
tion which, as was earlier discussed, 55 involves primarily the sig­
naling and quasi-performative uses of speech. Therefore, one 
should not and cannot expect "reality referents" in the sense Leff 
seems to desire. When one uses the term "unconscionability," one 
is concerned with the quality of a human relationship; when sec­
tion 2-302 of the U.C.C. is involved, one is concerned with a con­
tractual relationship which is a particular kind of human relation­
ship. Initially, the use of unconscionability signals the existence of 
a social-moral field of action which is delineated by an inherited 
tradition or vocabulary of moral precepts. This vocabulary of moral 
precepts constitutes a moral framework within which interpersonal 
dealings must remain. 
Unconscionable is used in ordinary language to describe action 
which is excessive, outrageous, or contrary to moral propriety, for 
example, the unconscionability of poverty in an affluent society, 
the unconscionability of forced sterilization and the unconscion­
ability of the use of war for political or economic gains. In each of 
these situations, the speaker is making a moral judgment which is a 
judgment delineated by the linguistic history of the terms used. To 
use the term "unconscionable" is to make a moral judgment. Its 
use moves the parties into a particular relationship; a certain atti­
tude is assumed by the speaker toward the other party or the ac­
tion, and certain kinds of consequences are sought. This linguistic 
entourage accompanies every use of the term. 
"Unconscionability" comes to its use in section 2-302 with a 
history constructed out of familiar and acceptable ways of treating 
others. Our moral vocabulary distinguishes for us the trivial from 
the serious breaches of conduct. For example, if one betrays a 
trust, one's action may be indiscreet, an abuse of trust or uncon­
scionable, depending on the nature of the trust and of the action. 
The question arises as to what point action ceases being indiscreet 
54. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
55. See notes 5 & 6 supra and accompanying text. 
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and becomes an abuse of trust, or ceases being an abuse of trust 
and becomes unconscionable. Obviously, there is no precise divid­
ing line. There are areas of overlap, yet we use the words compe­
tently and confidently. There are cases which are not clearly one or 
the other; some action may be indiscreet or an abuse of trust, but 
not indiscreet or unconscionable. That jump is too great. Our lan­
guage restricts us in our judgments. 
This same progression exists in contracts, especially in going 
from a hard bargain to an unconscionable one. There are clear 
cases of both with an area of overlap in which other policy factors 
may be determinative. But this is no different than many other 
areas of law such as due process, equal protection, or "unfair meth­
ods of competition" in the Federal Trade Commission Act. 56 Each 
phrase takes on meaning within a particular field of relevance. 57 
When dealing in each field, the judge through typification selec­
tively attends to factors historically, grammatically58 and legally rel­
evant to the application of the standard. Each field is built upon a 
certain orientation and certain facts and grouping of facts which are 
unquestioned. They form the background against which the partic­
ular problem will be viewed and the decision reached. 
Unconscionability signals a social-moral field of action which 
establishes a construct of contractual morality. Initially, this con­
struct appears to be a counterpoint to another fundamental contrac­
tual construct, freedom of contract. Finding the most eloquent jus­
tification in the writings of men like Adam Smith, Jeremy Bent­
hem, and John Stuart Mill,59 freedom of contract came to be 
equated with the free market system of capitalism. 60 Simultane­
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976). 
57. See A. SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS 111-12 (H. 
R. Wagner ed. 1970). For an expanded treatment of this notion see A. SCHUTZ, THE 
PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL WORLD (G. Walsh & F. Lehnert trans. 1967). 
58. Grammar is being used here in the Wittgensteinian sense. See L. WITTGEN­
STEIN, supra note 2. Pitkin notes that grammar, "includes all the various verbal ex­
pressions in which that word is characteristically used." H. PITKIN, supra note 3, at 
117. But she goes on to indicate that Wittgenstein is attempting to suggest a relation­
ship between grammar and the world. Grammar tells us what we call a particular 
"set of phenomena in the world." Id. at 118 (citing S. Cavell, The Claim to Rational­
ity 131 (1961-62) (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University)). She con­
tinues, grammar "specifies not merely the expressions in which a word is character­
istically used, but also ... what counts as an application of 'those expressions.' " Id. 
at 118. 
59. See Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 365 (1921). 
60. See Kessler, Contract as a Principle of Order, in READINGS IN JURISPRU­
DENCE AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 140-46 (M. Cohen & F. Cohen eds. 1951). 
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ously drawing upon individualistic philosophy with its concept of 
the autonomous will, and the "invisible hand"61 of Adam Smith, 
philosophers and jurists conceived of a contract as the freely 
formed agreement of autonomous individuals which provided the 
surest guarantee of economic and social progress. 
Yet, there has always been what Friedrich Kessler calls coun­
tercurrent62 in contract law which injects an element of moral­
ity or fairness into contract adjudication. Kessler points to the use 
of consideration as evidence of this phenomenon. Constructive 
fraud and promissory conditions are other examples. It is from this 
countercurrent that unconscionability receives its direction. The 
use of unconscionability in legal discourse signals this countercur­
rent of moral discourse in contract adjudication. This moral con­
struct signaled by unconscionability and the construct of freedom of 
contract for the nonthematic background against which courts must 
decide the question of contract unconscionability. In fact, the 
grammar of the term "freedom" includes the sense of interpersonal 
dealings which accredit the commonality of people and the need 
for each person to be allowed to achieve his potential. This is be­
cause of the interdependent nature of our possibilities. 63 
It is because of this grammatical inheritance that Professor 
M. P. Ellinghaus' description of unconscionability as a residual cate­
gory term is misleading. 64 In his attempt to define unconscion­
ability as a viable legal tool, Ellinghaus concedes too much to 
Left" s charge of debilitating vagueness. Ellinghaus resigns 
unconscionability to a residual category in order to salvage its use­
fulness. He admits that its content may be illusory and then pro­
ceeds to justify this illusoriness. 65 Such a defense can be required 
only if one proceeds, as Ellinghaus apparently does, from a label 
theory of language: unconscionability is a thing to be filled up with 
definite meaning. When one sees unconscionability performatively 
as a term to be used to do certain things, to bring about certain re­
sults, then such a defense is seen as being erroneously based, just 
as the position against which it is defending. Residual category con­
notes a usage which is akin to a repository of illusory concepts to 
61. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (1937). 
62. See Kessler, supra note 60, at 143; F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS 
37 (2d ed. 1970). 
63. See generally M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME § 58, at 325 (H. Macquarrie 
& E. Robinson trans. 1962). 
64. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757 (1969). 
65. Id. at 760. 
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which resort is had when more precise tools are unavailable. Sup­
posedly, this would contrast with a normal precision in legal gram­
mar, but that is a precision which seldom exists. 
Needs of new situations may require extensions, or additions 
to the legal grammar of unconscio_nability, but although such use 
may be a deformation, it is a coherent deformation66 in the gram­
mar. This is the same manner in which case law has grown in all 
areas. For example, the grammar of the legal term "defamation," 
moved from direct assault upon one's character67 to innuendo 
which may disrupt one's social intercourse68 through the same 
process of coherent deformation. Defamation has no more of a real­
ity referent than does unconscionability and is no more residual in 
its meaning. There is nothing empty which needs to be filled in ei­
ther case, but only new situations which require creative applica­
tion and perhaps addition of new characteristics to the existing con­
ceptual family.69 Each time, however, the new adjudication is 
performed against a background which guides and limits the use of 
the term. The grammar of the term carries with it its own field of 
application. 
What happens when the term is used and what is the quasi­
performative function? Naturally, when one uses that term with 
reference to or as descriptive of a contractual relationship, one has 
expressed an attitudinal posture toward the relationship in terms 
of, or against the background of, the social-moral field of action and 
the included construct of contractual morality. When a judge says a 
contract is unconscionable, he is moving the level of discourse from 
a political-legal to a moral-legal field. The legal perspective of the 
contractual relationship has changed and the jural consequences of 
that relationship are different. The judge is no longer looking for a 
bargain to enforce, or to determine damages for breach. He is now 
thinking in remedial terms in favor of the weaker party. It is this 
66. This idea of coherent deformation in expanding uses of language is bor­
rowed from Maurice Merleau-Ponty. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS 68 (R. McCleary 
trans. 1964). 
67. Smale v. Hammon, 80 Eng. Rep. 743 (K.B. 1610). 
68. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d .Cir. 1945), cen. denied, 
326 U.S. 979 (1946). 
69. See L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, § 67, at 32. Wittgenstein develops the 
notion of family resemblances to describe the grammar of a word. The word, any 
word, is used in various instances to perform certain functions, to say certain things, 
for example, the word "games." Compare chess, solitaire, football and children's 
games. They are not identical and there is no one definition of game; but they all 
share certain resemblances, like family members. 
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movement in the nature of the discourse, and the creation of a dif­
ferent kind of jural relationship, which is effected by the courts' 
use of the term "unconscionable." 
This change in the nature of the discourse also occurs when 
the court states that it or a lower court must review the relation­
ship to see if it is unconscionable. This may result from the court's 
own initiative, or more likely, from an attorney's argument. When 
the latter chooses to argue unconscionability, he is attempting to 
create a particular kind of relationship, to take a certain view of the 
case and to discuss the case in different terms. The attorney's deci­
sion to argue unconscionability is an attempt to control the nature 
of the ensuing legal discourse; he seeks to argue more in terms of 
contractual morality than in the technical legal vocabulary relating 
to formation of contract. It is this move in the nature of the dis­
course which is performed when one uses the term "uncon­
scionability." U nconscionabili ty is used in discourse of and about 
human action, and it involves a judgment about the quality of a hu­
man relationship. Thus, its use by a court directs one to the quality 
of the relationship existing between the parties in dispute, and 
does so in terms of a moral evaluation of that relationship. A few 
cases will demonstrate this point. 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture CO.70 involved a condi­
tional sales agreement which required all installment payments to 
be applied pro rata to all "outstanding leases, bills and ac­
counts. "71 The effect of this provision was to maintain a balance 
due on each item purchased until the balance due on all items was 
paid. Thus, each item became security for all others. In this case, a 
default on a stereo set purchased in 1962 triggered an attempt to 
replevy all items purchased since 1957. The court reversed a hold­
ing for the furniture company and remanded for further findings on 
the possible unconscionability of the contract. 72 The trial court had 
made no such findings, contending it had no grounds upon which 
to refuse enforcement. 73 The appellate court read the then recent 
enactment of the U.C.C. by Congress as persuasive authority for 
following the common law cases which developed the uncon­
scionability doctrine codified in section 2-302.74 
70. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. CiT. 1965). 
71. [d. at 447. The lease language referred to purchase of goods treated as 
leases until full payment, at which time title would pass from the company to the 
purchaser. 
72. [d. at 450. 
73. [d. at 448. 
74. [d. at 449. 
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Recalling the earlier point that unconscionability involves the 
evaluation of a human relationship, this case can be analyzed in re­
lational terms to understand what factors determined the court's 
conclusion. Contracts involve the voluntary agreement by one 
party to perform certain acts for a return agreement to perform 
certain other acts: obligations voluntarily assumed in return for a 
desired performance. Here, as in cases of consideration, the rela­
tional balance existing in the agreement is determinative. The court 
prefers nonenforcement because the company dominated the rela­
tionship in a degree disproportionate to the obligations it had 
incurred. Had the company sought only to replevy the stereo set 
purchased in 1962, the court most likely would have enforced the 
contract. Such action by the company would have been commensu­
rate with the obligation existing on both sides. But to maintain a 
security interest in items purchased five years earlier through the 
pro rata application of all payments evidences a commercial en­
slavement of the consumer. The company extended credit to a con­
sumer who it knew or should have known could not afford the 
items purchased. 75 The possibility existed that the company could 
receive some payment for the stereo, then upon default, replevy it 
plus all other items purchased, and derive a profit from their ulti­
mate resale because of the interest and principal already received. 
The court remanded and directed the lower court to analyze 
the parties' relationship in terms of the relative ability of the par­
ties to understand the terms of the contract and to bargain for the 
terms, and also to determine the relative balance in the obligations 
incurred and consideration received. 76 The critical question was 
whether the consumer was capable of an informed and voluntary 
choice in entering the contract, or had the contract been imposed 
on him because of his lack of understanding or economic bar­
gaining power. If the latter is the case, the resulting relational 
imbalance would move the court toward nonenforcement. Freedom 
of contract has to be subordinated to contractual morality in such 
circumstances. As the court states: "In such a case the usual rule 
that the terms of the agreement are not to be questioned should be 
75. Id. at 448. The court noted that the contract listed the name of the consum­
er's social worker and the amount of her welfare check, $218 per month. The stereo 
set cost $514. Id. 
76. Id. at 449-50. The court listed as relevant; whether the contract terms un­
reasonably favored one party; the comparative education or lack of education of the 
parties; the location of the terms in the contract; the relative bargaining power of the 
parties. Id. 
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abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the 
contract are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld. "77 
Similarly, in Jones v. Star Credit COrp.,78 the court stated 
that section 2-302 enacts the moral sense of the community into 
the law of commercial transactions. 79 The primary issue in the case 
was whether in the attendant circumstances the price term of a 
contract was unconscionable. The plaintiffs purchased a freezer for 
$900 plus financing charges which was shown to be worth $300. 
The seller knew that the consumers were welfare recipients. As 
welfare recipients, the consumers had limited financial resources, 
yet the seller sold them a freezer at three times its actual value. 
The seller had a gross inequality of bargaining power from which 
the court could infer an absence of meaningful choice by the con­
sumers.80 The court discusses the quality of a contractual relation­
ship and subordinates the notion of absolute freedom to contract to 
that of contractual morality. 
Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co., 81 which denied 
a claim of unconscionability, further illustrates the point. Athough 
the seller received a profit of over 100% on the sale of household 
effects, exclusive of financing charges, the court found the factors 
of voluntariness and choice were present to the degree that the re­
sulting imbalance had not been imposed. 82 The buyer had been 
free to participate in comparison shopping. Here, freedom of con­
tract did not produce a result intolerable to the underlying moral­
ity of contractual relationships. This was a hard bargain, perhaps 
unfair to a degree, but there was not such an inequality in the par­
ties' relational status to justify nonenforcement. 
This same analysis applies when the bargaining positions of the 
parties were relatively equal, but certain terms of the agreement 
skew the parties' relational balance. There are only a few of these 
cases. 83 One example is United States Leasing Corp. v. Franklin 
77. ld. 
78. 59 Misc. 2d 189,298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969). 
79. ld. at 191,298 N.Y.S.2d at 266. 
80. ld. at 192,298 N.Y.S.2d at 267. 
81. 280 A.2d 775 (D.C.' 1971). 
82. ld. at 776. 
83. Such a case would generally be in a commercial setting and,the courts are 
reluctant to accept a claim of unconscionability here because of the relatively equal 
power and knowledge of the parties. See generally J. D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William 
Davies Co., 46 Ill. App. 3d 1,351 N.E.2d 243 (1976); S. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNI­
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-2, at 113, § 12-11, at 383 (1972). 
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Plaza Apartments, Inc., 84 which involved a lease-purchase arrange­
ment which was treated by the court as a contract for the sale of 
goods, an address printing machine. The name plates for use in the 
printer were never delivered, and thus, the machine was useless. 
The defendant refused to pay and the plaintiff sued for the price. 
Although the defendant had negotiated with Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 
the lease denoted the plaintiff as lessor and Pitney-Bowes as sup­
plier. Defendant had never dealt with the plaintiff during nego­
tiations. 85 
The terms of the contract disclaimed on behalf of the plaintiff 
all warranties, express or implied, and any responsibility for instal­
lation or operation of the printer. The plaintiff assigned all rights it 
had under warranties given it by the supplier to the defendant. 
This was held to be illusory because it was not shown that any such 
warranties had been given. The purpose of these provisions was 
summarized by the court as being the desire to disassociate de­
fenses and to isolate payment from any warranties given defendant 
by Pitney-Bowes. 86 Because it would be inequitable to compel pay­
ment for equipment which could not be used, while denying the 
defendant the right to interpose any defenses, the court found the 
terms to be unconscionable. 87 
Although the relationship of the parties was relatively equal 
during the transformational stage, the substantive terms of the con­
tract destroyed that equality. To enforce those provisions would 
permit a type of commercial domination contrary both to our com­
mon sense offairness and to business needs and mores. The obliga­
tions imposed on the defendant greatly outweighed any benefit re­
ceived. He has to pay to a party with whom he did not deal the 
full price of goods he cannot use, in return for a right to sue the 
party with whom he did deal and who has refused to de.liver con­
forming goods. This isolation of right to price from responsibility 
for warranties and other contractual obligations undermined the re­
lational equality necessary for the proper functioning of contractual 
relationships. 
84. 65 Misc. 2d 1082,319 N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971). 
85. [d. at 1083, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 532. 
86. Id. at 1087, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 536. Such an arrangement is familiar in the con­
sumer context where an assignee of a retail sales agreement attempts to deflect any 
claims the consumer has with regard to the product to the original retailer while de­
manding payment from the consumer. Such clauses have been held to be uncon­
scionable. Star Credit Corp. v. Molina, 59 Misc. 2d 290, 298 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Civ. Ct. 
N.Y. 1969). 
87. 65 Misc. 2d at 1086, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 535. 
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The relational imbalance which is present in cases of uncon­
scionability grossly distorts the assumptions embedded in the doc­
trine of freedom of contract. This distortion produces the social­
political counterpoint to freedom of contract. A contractual rela­
tionship requires a relational balance stemming either from 
substantive fairness or fairness in the formation of the relationship. 
In using unconscionability to describe a contract, the court is say­
ing that the transformation of the social into the contractual rela­
tionship, either in the manner of that transformation or in the 
terms of the relationship, has resulted in a relational imbalance 
which is intolerable when measured against the construct of con­
tractual morality which forms the jural background of such relation­
ships. 
The cited cases are rather typical of the kind of analysis courts 
use to determine questions of unconscionability. A review of the 
cases reveals that courts focus on certain factors in determining this 
issue. As seen, the factors include voluntariness, equality of bar­
gaining power, meaningful choice, educational and financial status 
of the parties and the obligations incurred in return for the consid­
eration received. These factors give shape to the phenomenon of 
unconscionability, and the review of the speech situations in which 
the term is used reveals the term's grammar which serves to isolate 
the phenomenon for further study. 
These terms all go to the relational status of the parties and 
the relational balance in the contract. In comparison to the favored 
party, the issue is whether the other party entered the relationship 
without coercion or imposition. The court considers whether the 
party made the decision to enter from a position in which he both 
understood the nature of the relationship and had the ability to 
have his interests considered with the same weight as the other 
party's interests. Ability includes financial, educational and social 
factors. Finally, court's look to whether the relational balance is so 
distorted in terms of the obligations the party has incurred as com­
pared to the consideration he has given or received as to justify the 
inference of a negative answer to the above questions. These fac­
tors describe a relational phenomenon in which one party has such 
a superior position or advantage as to destroy the sense of agree­
ment which underlies contract, and to substitute a sense of domi­
nation. 
When one considers the notions of stronger-weaker, superior­
inferior, choice-no choice, obligation without adequate reciprocity, 
and relational balance versus imbalance, one is lead inevitably to 
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the notion of equality. The term does not mean identity, but does 
signal a range within which such relationships should be confined. 
Equality tends to set only a minimal standard. To state it differ­
ently, the legal discourse of unconscionability seems to describe a 
contractual relationship in which the relational imbalance has be­
come so skewed as to eliminate a minimal equality in the relation 
of the parties. It is when the imbalance reaches this point that a 
court moves to nonenforcement of the particular contract or 
provision. 
An unconscionable contract is distinguished from a hard bar­
gain, a bad bargain and an unfair bargain. Some degree of unfair­
ness or harshness is tolerable, though not commendable. Here, as 
with consideration, the question is what amount of unfairness is too 
much. As with consideration, relational balance is sought and the 
amount of imbalance required necessitates an analysis of the con­
cept of equality. We have seen that inequality as such is insuffi­
cient for court interference. It has also become clear, however, 
that some equality is necessary. The cases appear to delineate a 
sense of minimal equality which is necessary for a contractual rela­
tionship to receive judicial approval. Contractual morality limits 
freedom of contract and does so by requiring minimal equality in 
the relationship. An analysis of such language as voluntariness, 
meaningful choice, equality of bargaining power, and balance in 
consideration given and received, reveals that in legal discourse 
they all are grammatically related to equality. They are all used to 
evaluate the quality of a relationship and do so in terms of the 
equality of the relational status of the parties. None require abso­
lute equality, but all require a minimal equality. What then is the 
meaning, or the use, of the phrase "minimal equality in legal 
discourse?" 
One final caveat, in keeping with the original intent of this ar­
ticle. There has not been an attempt to evaluate the effectiveness 
of unconscionability as a legal tool, nor to speculate on its future 
applications. This article merely attempts to disclose the sense of 
the concept as used in legal discourse. 
MINIMAL EQUALITY 
This section88 explicates the ground of contract adjudication as 
88. Though originally developed for this article, the analysis in this section was 
first presented in condensed fonn in a paper presented to a symposium sponsored by 
the Ohio Program in the Humanities on Quality Integrated Education, in Akron, 
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developed from the foregoing analysis of consideration and un­
conscionability. The discussion of each of these phenomena leads to 
the single theme of minimal equality. It was this felt need for 
equality which inwardly, and perhaps not always cognitively, led 
the court to a decision of enforcement or nonenforcement. Law is a 
relational phenomenon, and it was seen that an analysis of the ap­
plication of legal principles in terms of the relational balance 
between the adversary parties served to expose the existential 
grounds for the decisions. These grounds are bound up with the 
lived understanding of the judges, their familiarity with social phe­
nomena and the ability to form typifications based on that subjec­
tive experience. The ability to typify individual social phenomena 
enables the judge to apply general legal principles to concrete 
cases in a coherent, consistent fashion. The process is rational be­
cause it defines an identifiable, coherent region of discourse, a par­
ticular orientation toward human problems which specifies the 
manner of resolution. That which characterizes this region or orien­
tation is its imposition of a typification and a particular construct of 
relevancies89 onto the parties in dispute. This imposed typification 
constitutes a requirement of a minimal equality between the par­
ties in their relationship to the law as to those elements or traits 
which are relevant in determining that equality. 
The term "equality" is used in several different speech situa­
tions such as in political or scientific discourse. Within each region 
of discourse the term is used to do different things. The context in 
which the term is used and the point of the discourse determines 
the concrete meaning of the term. Each region requires a typifica­
tion of the situations and problems which arise or have to be re­
solved within that region. 90 Thus, the purpose for creating the typ­
ification is crucial in attempting to understand the concept; and it 
follows that the relevant traits in determining what we mean by 
equality are those traits relevant to the resolution of that problem. 
The sense of minimal equality must be constructed from a descrip­
tion of the speech situations which determine its use. 
Ohio, October 7, 1977. The paper, reprinted by permission, applied the present anal­
ysis to the fourteenth amendment. 
89. See Schutz, Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World, in 
ASPECTS OF HUMAN EQUALITY 33, 65 (Conference on Science, Philosophy and Reli­
gion No. 15, 1955) (L. Bryson, L. Faust, L. Finkelstein & R. Maciver eds. 1956). 
90. The need to analyze typifications in terms of the purpose for their creation 
and the need to discuss equality in terms of homogeneous sets of typifications is as 
developed by Schutz, and used in his essay on equality. Id. 
480 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:453 
In logical systems, equality is used to indicate an identity be­
tween two propositions. Since such discourse is not about human 
action, it is not relevant to present purposes except as it yields a 
part of the grammar of equality or equivalence. , 
Political discourse is more fruitful since it is human action and 
it is precisely human action that is involved in the legal discourse 
of contract law. Equality is used in political discourse initially to 
create and to impose a certain typification onto society. That typifi­
cation, or political paradigm, involves an inherent orientation to­
ward the community by government which focuses on the com­
monality of man rather than on his individuality. This is done to 
create a political structure within which each individual can express 
his talents most fully and pursue his interests most effectively by 
removing the legitimization of a politically created disadvantage of 
one with reference to another. The paradigm determines that only 
those traits which relate to formal inclusion within the political sys­
tem are relevant in determining the basic citizen-state 
relationship. 
The Greek pOliS91 exemplifies this situation. Once a determi­
nation had been made relative to inclusion, then the government 
recognized no differentiation between the members in terms of 
their relationship to each other and to the state. Equality was used 
only in political discourse of and about the polis. Those outside 
the polis had a different relationship, not an unequal one. Inequality 
would be manifest only if the governmental body treated a mem­
ber of the polis either in a more advantageous or disadvantageous 
manner. Similarly, citizens of the United .States are treated equally 
by the state while non-citizens can be treated differently, vis-a-vis 
citizens, but that is not unequal treatment. Since equality and ine­
quality are relational notions, they can be used consistently only 
within homogeneous groups. 92 
91. A Greek city-state, in its ideal fonn as a community, embodies the organiza­
tion and fulfillment of man's social relations. 
92. Schutz, supra note 89, at 46. Our political system does treat citizens and 
noncitizens in the same way in certain cases, for example, contracts with noncitizens. 
In such cases, they are treated "as citizens" for purposes of the case. In those in­
stances, they are part of the citizen group and political equality applies to the court's 
actions. Discriminations which recognize differing and legitimate needs of classes of 
citizens, such as welfare payments or veterans benefits, do not· disrupt the basic 
citizen-state relationship as they do not create any political inequality in govemmen-. 
tal treatment of citizens. All people who bring themselves within these classifica­
tions are treated equally, and no one is precluded from demonstrating eligibility for 
inclusion in the classes. 
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One uses the term "equality" in political discourse to create or 
to attempt to create a particular kind of relationship in a particular 
situation by concretizing the general notion embodied in the para­
digm. Thus, to say that the government cannot treat a person dis­
advantageously because of his color or sex is an attempt to concret­
ize the abstract notion of equality and to create a relationship and 
impose consequences of a particular kind in that situation. The 
questions of whether equality is good or bad, practical or not, and 
of the proper criteria for structuring the group, are all different 
questions. The point is that the term "equality" is used with refer­
ence to relations within homogeneous groups and signals an im­
posed typification, the purpose of which is to promote the realiza­
tion of the potential of the individual members by emphasizing 
their commonality in terms of an identity of interests in a political 
community. 
Equality is also used in discourse about social status. Here, 
several subsets of discourse can be involved, such as individual 
equality, equality in terms of acquisitions and economic equality. 
Individual equality may mean, for example, discussion of relative 
physical or intellectual abilities. Acquisition refers to such factors as 
education, developed skills and experience. Economic equality may 
involve the relative amount of wealth, broadly defined as financial 
credit potential, at the party's disposal in pursuing his needs and in­
terests. Equality, as used here, seems to assume a range of equiva­
lence within which people would be called equal; it does not re­
quire an identical matching of ability of acquisitions. In social 
discourse, as in other regions, the point of the discussion deter­
mines the scheme of relevancies to be applied. If one is discussing 
athletic potential, economic advantages are irrelevant. If one is dis­
cussing educational and intellectual potential, physical size or per­
sonal wealth are irrelevant. Social equality, however, stresses the 
individuality of peop\e as opposed to their commonality. 
One often discusses social equality in judgmental terms. It is 
an evaluation of the ability or effectiveness of a government to 
meet the needs of the citizens. Also, one may attempt to create 
new relationships with the state by discussing the social inequali­
ties of the community. Such discourse focuses on equality in the 
sense of acquired and economic status. This is an attempt to trans­
form social discourse into political discourse by relating social ine­
quality to political action. The reason why the question of equality 
is posed determines the relevant elements and the regions of con­
cern. The question presupposes a background against which it is 
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used, a background created by decisions or orientations premised 
upon other grounds, for example, moral grounds involving whether 
social equality is good or necessary for human happiness. 
The political orientation toward commonality, and the social 
orientation toward individuality, is a manifestation of certain exis­
tential structures of the living world. 93 At the first awareness, man 
is already in the world, already involved with others, already a 
member of a community, such as the family, tribe or state. One's 
first awareness is not of individuation but of commonality,94 and it 
is only with maturation that individuation occurs. Each of one's 
personal projects is comprised of possibilities for action which re­
late to and are to some extent determined by the possibilities of 
others. One's potentiality is then dependent upon the actions of 
others, and vice versa. Thus, the realization of individual potential­
ity is inextricably related to other's realization of one's potential. 
This is part of the human situation into which we are born. One 
learns of oneself, his situation through others, and they through 
him. 95 We share a world, the meaning of which has its locus in 
intersubjectivity. Part of the existential situation of man is this pri­
mordial commonality from which man's projects are launched, and 
which orients him toward an understanding of his existence. 
Denying this commonality and accepting only individuation fails to 
accredit part of man's nature. 
Even given this commonality, however, one is set off against 
others to some extent. One knows oneself in a different way then 
one knows others or other things. For example, the question "Is 
this my hand?" is nonsense without a very rare context. Can one 
prove it is his hand? No, the question is nonsense. This tacit 
knowledge96 one has of oneself, if it can indeed be called knowl­
edge, testifies to one's individuation. One's history, though em­
bedded in a shared world and a shared history, is still somehow 
93. The following discussion, while not drawn directly from anyone section, is 
derived in its basic theory from Martin Heidegger. See M. HEIDEGGER, BEING AND 
TIME 0. Macquarries & E. Robinson trans. 1962) (one of the most thorough descrip­
tions of the existential structures of the life world). 
94. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE ACQUISITION OF LAN­
GUAGE (H. Silverman trans. 1973). Merleau-Ponty sees consciousness of self as being 
a function of language, which is an intersubjective phenomenon. See also MERLEAU­
PONTY, supra note 8. 
95. This is not the place to restate the fullness of Heidegger's description. See 
generally note 93 supra, at 149. 
96. See, e.g., L. WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 2 (D. Paul & G. Anscombe 
trans. 1969). 
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one's own and somewhat different than others. One relates to oth­
ers in a variety of ways, such as love, hate and indifference, but 
can do so on an individual basis. One is individuated within anoth­
er's primordial commonality. For example, one can be a member 
of a team playing football, but still be an individual who happens to 
be playing with others. 
It is this apparent gap between oneself and the other which 
has been a central problem for philosophy and cultural institutions. 
The Cartesian world view with its autonomous ego is paradigmatic 
for Western Society. It is this perspective of human relations which 
Sartre described. 97 By understanding consciousness as a consti­
tuting consciousness, isolated for the world, he constituted,· in­
stead, the problem of the other. If our consciousness is constitutive 
of reality, then it also constitutes the other; but the other is also a 
consciousness and thus is constitutive of "me"; that is, ''I'' have be­
come an object for him. But this is impossible for Sartre, as con­
sciousness cannot be an object. Thus, there is conflict and 
alienation, with no hope of reconciliation. 
Merleau-Ponty, however, refuted this description. 98 Con­
sciousness is an opening out onto the world, it is a perceptual con­
sciousness, and thus, there is no problem of another perceiving 
consciousness; others are in the world. The other is given to "me" 
as being in the world as ''I'' am in the world. ''I'' am given to 
"myself" as already being in a situation within an intersubjective 
world. In this situation other people are, to some extent, superior 
and inferior to "me." But that facticity is resolved through a bodily 
dialogue which finds its clearest expression in speech. Through dia­
logue we constitute a single world in which we coexist. This human 
situation is a primordial commonality upon which all cultural insti­
tutions are grounded and which makes community possible. 
Although in a formal sense the law accepts the Cartesian per­
spective as, for example, in its insistence on free, autonomous will, 
in practice, that perspective is abandoned and law operates more 
in terms of an intersubjective world. When a jury has to determine 
intent, such as criminal or contractual intent, it must reject the au­
tonomous ego and look for human action in a common world. In 
such a case the other is seen in terms of his actions. 99 We read 
from his actions, certain experiences and intentions which do not 
97. See generally J. P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS (1956). 
98. See generally M. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 8, at 346, 369. 
99. Id. at 356. See also L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 2, at 243-315. 
484 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:453 
depend on our gaining access to any "inner experiences or actions" 
but which are intelligible because such external actions are modes 
of being in the world, modes which we share, which derive from 
the human situation. Such a method of determination implicitly re­
nounces any separation between consciousness and the body, but 
performs an integration which replaces the Cartesian position with 
an intersubjective perspective. Such an integration allows us to un­
derstand the actions of the other, to deal with him intelligently as 
both an individual and as a member of the community. Because we 
can understand him, we can judge him, and in judging him we 
recognize his individuation with his commonality. 
It is against a background of political and social, common and 
individual fields of action that the law operates. Since law is a crea­
ture of government, but also a social or cultural institution which 
reflects that culture and functions within it, law partakes of both 
political and social notions of equality: commonality and individual­
ity. Being governmental, law imposes a typification of equality onto 
parties in a lawsuit. Both political and legal systems establish basic 
relationships of equality in the state's relation to its citizens. Thus 
the state, through its courts, imposes a typification of equality onto 
citizens which sees as relevant factors only those dealing with 
membership within the society, such as equal protection of the 
law, or a fair and impartial tribunal. Other factors such as religion 
or race are deemed irrelevant as not going to the basic sense of the 
citizen-state relationship. 
As a social institution, law must reflect social realities. There­
fore, law does recognize certain social equalities and inequalities. 
The problem is one of establishing political equality and recog­
nizing social inequality. In seeking to reconcile these different typi­
fications, which created equality with recognized inequality, courts 
impose a legal typification on both of the other systems. This is a 
typification of minimal equality according to which a court deter­
mines when the inequality of the social system is so dominant as to 
nullify the equality of the political system. The court must balance 
the competing interests because it is imposing equality on an ac­
cepted system of inequality; it must respond to all the needs and 
realities of the society. 
Social inequalities are not as such illegal, but great advantage 
gained from such inequality by the stronger party can distort the 
political equality the government is committed to create. Although 
the political system allows social inequalities, it is required to act 
in an equal fashion. Thus, the court, which is governmentaL can­
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not impose legal consequences which shatter the basic political 
equality the government must create. If the court imposed legal 
consequences which allowed a stronger party to impose severe con­
sequences on a weaker party due to great social inequality, the 
court would be participating in maintaining social inequality when 
it is required by its governmental status only to recognize such ine­
quality but not to act to "establish" it. Using the state to enforce 
social inequality is sufficient to trigger the constitutional, political 
prohibition against unequal protection of the laws. loo 
The court faces the problem of insuring at least a minimal 
equality between the parties so as to operate within its institutional 
boundaries. This problem and the court's resolution are ex­
emplified in Bell v. Tsintolas Realty CO.lOl The essential question 
presented was whether tenants proceeding in forma pauperis in 
defense to a landlord's summary suit for possession must pay past 
due and future rent into the court registry pending resolution of 
the case. The court held that this procedure should be followed on­
ly in those limited circumstances where it would not unduly tip the 
adversarial balance in the litigation. The constitutional procedural 
role of the court was seen as "equaliz[ing] the conditions of the ad­
versary system for the poor,"102 in both criminal and civil litiga­
tion. lo3 This principle of equalization is essential to provide the 
poor with meaningful access to and participation in the judicial sys­
tem. 104 This principle of adjudicative equalization has been applied 
primarily in the context of the state-citizen relationship in terms of 
due process and equal protection. I05 In fact, this is the conceptual 
basis of the in forma pauperis provision. As a principle of judicial 
100. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
101. 430 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
102. Id. at 479. 
103. See Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
104. Harris v. Harris, 424 F.2d 806, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
105. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), wherein the court held that 
the effective exercise of a statutory right to appeal in criminal cases cannot be con­
tingent upon a party's wealth. Thus the state of Illinois was required to provide tran­
scripts for indigent criminal defendants. The decision was based upon both equal 
protection and due process claims. Justice Harlan, dissenting, argued that only a due 
process analysis was relevant and such an analysis did not require such action. Id. at 
36-39. The jurisprudential overlap of due process and equal protection concepts in 
articulating the fundamental requirements for judicial process in this country is ap­
parent in any number of cases. E.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (in­
validated filing fee requirements in divorce proceedings for indigent persons). The 
Court's opinion by Justice Harlan used a due process analysis. Id. at 374. Justice 
Douglas' concurring opinion relied on equal protection principles. [d. at 383. Justice 
Brennan, concurring, argued both concepts. [d. at 386. 
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process, however, it applies to every dispute which involves judi­
cial resolution. As previously argued, this principle is inherent in 
the nature of a democratic political system and in the developed 
political sensibilities of our society. Thus, one may derive adjudica­
tive equalization from the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clause of the Constitution, or one may ground those provisions 
upon the former principle. Resolution of that issue is beyond the 
scope and purpose of the present task which is one of preliminary 
jurisprudence, that is to describe and thereby to disclose the 
ground of the adjudicative process, not to analyze that ground. The 
fact is that courts in contract and other cases do practice adjudica­
tive equalization in terms of minimal equality. It is precisely this 
need to insure equality which directs the court in its use of legal 
principles, such as consideration and unconscionability. The court 
uses these principles to move the parties into a relationship which 
reflects a minimal equality, and this is done either by denying en­
forcement, granting enforcement or modifYing the contract and 
then enforcing. The court is acting affirmatively in each situation to 
create equality if it is not present. 
In Webb v. McGowin,106 a relational balance had been 
achieved but the estate sought to destroy that balance by having 
the contract declared unenforceable. The court, seeking to main­
tain a minimal equality in that situation, enforced the contract. 
Harrington v. Taylor l07 was the opposite case. No contractual rela­
tionship had arisen or was intended. To enforce would have been 
to create inequality. Williarns v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,l°s 
established a minimal equality between the poverty level consumer 
and the stronger businessman by determining whether the latter's 
method of maintaining a security interest in goods sold was uncon­
scionable. Denying enforcement in such a case deprives the busi­
nessman of an undue advantage gained because of great social ine­
quality. The court refused to allow legal process to be used as a 
means of enforcing undue advantages gained by virtue of great so­
cial inequality. 
Courts cannot, however, eliminate social inequality. In fact, 
they must allow it, because the political system allows it, as long as 
that allowance does not eliminate political equality. Thus, hard bar­
106. 232 Ala. at 374, 168 So. at 199 (questions of moral consideration). 
107. 225 N.C. at 690, 36 S.E.2d at 227 (questions of moral consideration). 
108. See note 59 supra and accompanying text discussing questions of un­
conscionability. 
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gains or unfair exhanges are allowed. Such consequences are within 
the tolerable limits of the system. In this way, the courts recognize 
social realities and individual differences which the political system 
allows, while providing a minimum of equality which that system 
requires. This was the case in Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Ap­
pliance Co. ,109 in which the social inequality was insufficient to an­
nul the sense of political equality the court must maintain. There­
fore, even though it was a hard and somewhat unfair bargain, the 
court enforced the contract. 
Minimal equality, then, as sought in contract law cases, mani­
fests the courts' attempt to reconcile their political duty to create 
equality with its recognition of social inequality. It is an attempt to 
reconcile commonality and individuation in a way designed to 
maintain social cohesiveness and political stability. 
CONCLUSION 
Contract law forms a particular region of legal discourse in 
which principles of law are used to maintain a minimal equality in 
a reciprocal, bargained relationship between members of the com­
munity who submit themselves to its law. By focusing on the use 
of the terms "contract," "consideration" or "unconscionability," one 
can see contracts asa field of legal discourse comprised of a family 
of uses of each term, the use or meaning determined by the 
speech situation and the term's grammatical history. This linguistic 
field is grounded upon a movement toward minimal equality as the 
courts try to reconcile different dimensions of equality as they per­
form their political function. 
Contract law, then, is an act of the legal system in particular 
cases of adjudication. This legal act can only be fully understood 
through an analysis of the life-world: the subjective world of the 
parties and the judges as the latter seek to understand the actions 
of the former. It is only in this doing of law, in this use of the 
terms of law, that the meaning of these terms are manifest. To 
state it differently, a contract is not a thing, it is a legal concept 
whose meaning is contained in the actual speech situations of its 
use. 
The case method of teaching contract law provides an excel­
lent method for explicating this understanding of contracts. Each 
case can be seen as a speech situation and the use of the terms can 
109. 280 A.2d at 775 (questions of unconscionability). See also text accompa­
nying note 81 supra. 
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be analyzed in terms of the case, rather than extracted as rules and 
considered apart from the context. The student's attention is then 
diverted from seeking the "existence" of a contract, and turned to­
ward the way courts use the terms "contract" or "consideration." 
This refocusing makes the student "process conscious"; it helps 
to bring him inside the system rather than having him observe 
only the superstructure. When the student looks for family rela­
tionships rather than symmetry in the use of legal terms, such as 
"contract," he can reconcile cases as being different uses of the 
same term within the family, and not despair of inconsistencies. 
\Vhat appears to be contradictions are exposed as usages from dif­
ferent dimensions of the term's grammar. Furthermore, this kind 
of process orientation requires the student to consider the subjec­
tive understanding of the actors, and helps him to understand why 
that is not speculative. This reorientation to the life-world can ena­
ble the student to understand the law as a cultural institution and 
help him to appreciate its human dynamic-the ground of its oper­
ation in society. 
The law of contracts viewed from the above perspective is 
compatible with the position of a Kesslerllo or a Llewellyn, III but 
the methodology is sufficiently different so as to complete the 
break with positivism and present a clearer understanding of 
contract-Iaw-in-use. What has been proposed is not a new defini­
tion of contract, but a method, a way of going about teaching and 
understanding the law of contracts. It was only this approach which 
was the theme of this essay and not any particular substantive 
point. 
Finally, an uncritical generalization from the above discussion 
to every use of "contract" is not suggested, nor that the function 
discussed here is the only function of the courts. Minimal equality, 
however, plays a central role in contractual-legal discourse. There 
are areas of contract law which seem to emphasize other policies, 
such as the problem of illegal contracts. Even here, however, the 
court is cognizant of its political role to maintain political equality. 
To allow legal condonation of illegal acts violates the notion of po­
litical equality by allowing certain citizens to violate the law or con­
travene public policy without sanction. Further, such judicial ac­
tion would allow the illegal actor to derive social benefits from his 
110. See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, supra note 62, at 2-14. 
111. See, e.g., Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 
YALE L.J. 704 (19.31). 
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illegal act and thus gain advantage over his law abiding counter­
part. Thus, the nonenforcement by courts of illegal contracts is an 
attempt by the courts to avoid that misuse of the legal process. 
Even in this area, in appropriate instances, a court can construe 
the contract, or the particular law or policy the contract contra­
venes, to allow enforcement in order to promote a minimal equal­
ity,112 
The law of contracts, therefore, presents a system of related 
speech situations each of which is unique in some respects, but 
each of which fits into a coherent pattern of legal discourse. This 
article has advanced the thesis that the unifying theme of this co­
herent pattern is the search for a minimal equality in contractual 
relationships. While only contract adjudication has been discussed, 
the methodologies used in the discussion apply to all areas of the 
law, and if used generally in legal analysis, will add both to our un­
derstanding and to our teaching of law. 
112. See, e.g., Liberman v. Rosenthal" 18.5 Misc. 837, .57 N.Y.S.2d 87.5 (Sup. Ct. 
194.5); H.O. Meyer Drilling Co. v. Alton V. Phillips Co., 2 Wash. App. 600, 468 P.2d 
1008 (1970). 
